Switzerland Rejects a Popular Initiative ‘Against Foreign Judges’ by Schmid, E. et al.
 
Switzerland Rejects a Popular Initiative 
‘Against Foreign Judges’ 
17.12.18 | 0 Comments  
[Constance Kaempfer is writing a PhD on the role of subnational parliaments in 
implementing international obligations. Sophie Thirion conducts PhD research on trade 
measures in multilateral environmental agreements. Evelyne Schmid is an associate 
professor of public international law (http://www.ius-gentium.ch). All three authors are 
based at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.]  
On 25 November 2018, the Swiss population and the cantons voted on a popular initiative 
that sought to alter the place and role of international law within the domestic legal system. 
Whereas preliminary surveys attested considerable support for the proposal, the initiative was 
rejected by a surprisingly large majority of Swiss voters (66.2%) and by all cantons. The 
participation rate was unusually high (47.7%). In this post, we present the proposal, we 
explain why we opposed it and we argue that future debates about the relationship between 
the Swiss legal order and international law should avoid deterministic assumptions that such 
initiatives are the ‘natural’ consequence of the increased relevance of international norms. 
The initiative 
(Semi-)direct democracy in Switzerland foresees that a vote is held on any proposal for a 
constitutional amendment on any matter provided that 100’000 citizens sign the proposal and 
provided that the Federal Assembly does not declare the proposal to be invalid. On a side 
note, on 25 November, we not only voted on the initiative discussed in this post, but also on 
the question whether farmers who do not remove the horns from cows and goats should 
receive increased subsidies. 
The so-called ‘Swiss law, not foreign judges’ initiative (‘self-determination initiative’) was 
the result of a popular initiative launched in 2016 by the major right-wing Swiss party, the 
Swiss People’s Party. The full text of the initiative is available in French, in German and in 
Italian. The proposal sought to introduce the priority of the Swiss Constitution over 
international treaties, with the only exception being peremptory norms of international law. In 
the case of a conflict between an international treaty obligation and the Swiss Constitution, 
the initiative would have amended the constitution so that the Confederation and the cantons 
would have been obliged to ‘adapt’ international treaties to the constitution and withdraw 
from international treaties ‘if needed’. While the initiative would have left unchanged the 
existing constitutional obligation stipulating that ‘the Confederation and the cantons respect 
international law’, the initiative proposed to severely restrict the sources that the Federal 
Tribunal and the Swiss authorities would apply. Only treaties whose approbation by the 
Federal Assembly has been subject to a referendum would have remained applicable, thus 
excluding the vast majority of international treaties concluded by Switzerland before 2003, 
when the facultative referendum in the area of foreign policy was introduced. Without saying 
so explicitly, this provision endangered the application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ratified by Switzerland in 1974. 
This episode of Swiss direct democracy history must be understood both in its international 
and internal context. Internationally, the initiative is part of a wider phenomenon of 
challenging human rights through simplistic critiques of international institutions, 
international ‘elites’ and notably the EU. The awareness of why previous generations fought 
for the international recognition of human rights and the establishment of institutions 
mandated to protect them is fading. Domestically, the initiative was launched following a 
2012 decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in which the Court prevented the removal of a 
residence permit of a nineteen-year-old foreign national convicted of drug offenses. 
Following the adoption of the popular initiative on the removal of foreign criminals in 2010, 
the Swiss People’s Party hoped for automatic deportations without consideration of 
proportionality. Of course, this idea was in tension with both the ECHR but also our own 
Constitution. Additionally, the Swiss People’s Party was unhappy with the legislative 
implementation of their initiative on ‘mass immigration’ and argued that the root causes of 
their anger was that international bodies and authorities are constantly expanding the scope of 
international law and politicians and courts no longer implement popular initiatives because 
they invoke international norms. 
According to media reports, the campaign surrounding this proposal was one of the most 
expensive campaigns Switzerland has ever seen, with more money spent on the side of those 
favoring the proposal but considerable sums also being spent by the opponents, most notably 
by economiesuisse, the largest corporate union. 
Why we opposed the proposal 
If the ‘self-determination initiative’ had been accepted, it would have had various harmful 
consequences at the domestic and at the international level. At the domestic level, three 
aspects deserve to be mentioned here. 
First, contrary to other constitutional systems, the Swiss Constitution is comparatively easy to 
amend and there are few restrictions to do so. A popular initiative that does not – according to 
the assessment by the Federal Assembly – infringe a peremptory norm of international law 
can only be rendered invalid if it fails to comply with ‘the requirements of consistency of 
form and of subject matter’. For all the enthusiasm we have for direct democracy, this 
arrangement means that the constitutional lawmaker, i.e. the people and the cantons, can at 
any time abolish or restrict fundamental rights or modify the separation of powers. In case of 
tensions between new constitutional provisions and international law, the federal legislator 
and the authorities try to resort to what can be described as delicate creative pragmatism in 
order to accommodate both norms. 
Second, the ECHR plays a crucial and comparatively more important role within the Swiss 
domestic constitutional law framework than it does elsewhere. (For an English-language 
outline of the status quo, see the tab ‘documents’ on this website.) Switzerland follows the 
monist tradition which implies that international treaties do not need to be transposed. 
International norms will thus deploy most effects when they are considered directly 
applicable which is generally the case for the substantive norms of the ECHR. But this of 
course only works if the Federal Tribunal is given the right to actually apply them. If a ‘hard’ 
conflict of norms arises (i.e. one that cannot be solved by interpretation), there is a long-
established jurisprudence that international law usually prevails. (For the possible exceptions, 
see e.g. here.) This co-applicability of international law and domestic law is of particular 
importance because the Swiss constitutional system does not provide for constitutional 
review of federal laws, i.e. judicial authorities have to apply federal laws (and ordinances 
depending on federal laws) even if they are unconstitutional. (For an analysis in English, see 
Rosalind Dixon’s paper here.) However, given that international law is equally part of the 
applicable law, the Swiss Federal Tribunal can ensure that federal laws and their application 
comply with the ECHR and other international conventions. This ‘conventionality check’ 
would have been endangered if the initiative had been accepted (We use the term 
‘endangered’ rather than ‘abolished’ given that Switzerland ratified Protocols Nr. 14 and 15 
after the introduction of the facultative referendum for such treaties – these Protocols would 
thus seem to have remained applicable and the argument was made that the submission to the 
facultative referendum of the two protocols indirectly means that the ECHR as well enjoys 
the status of a treaty that might have remained applicable. Glady, the courts will not need to 
answer this question.) 
Third, the text of the proposal suffered from internal inconsistencies and ambiguities. For 
reasons of space, suffice it to say that it would have undoubtedly raised a plethora of complex 
legal questions than it pretended to solve (for more detail see an open letter by 201 law 
professors and lecturers here). It was mostly this issue of legal certainty that motivated the 
employers’ union to oppose the proposal, notably in relation to the Agreement on the Free 
Movement of Persons with the EU. 
We also opposed the initiative because it would have had deplorable consequences at the 
international level. The initiative would have harmed the reputation of Switzerland as a 
reliable partner internationally given that our Constitution would have stipulated that we 
distinguish two categories of treaties and will not apply some treaties in case of normative 
conflicts. Even more problematic, an acceptance of the ‘self-determination initiative’ would 
have been in line with other worrisome developments related to the protection of human 
rights in the Council of Europe and beyond. We are thus relieved that Switzerland decided to 
reject a proposal that indirectly aimed at targeting the role of the ECHR in the domestic legal 
system (and the domestic – not so much the foreign – judges applying it in national 
decisions). 
Where does this leave us?  
All’s well that ends well? Not quite. In our view, the rejection of the initiative provides an 
opportunity for honest reflections on the relationship between the Swiss legal order and 
international law. To name just a few ideas: 
 there are reflections on how the Swiss constitutional system can continue to assure the 
domestic democratic legitimacy of international norms that ae not contained in 
international treaties, 
 a legislative proposal to clarify the internal division of competence for the withdrawal 
from international treaties, 
 the idea to openly discuss a constitutional presumption of ‘friendliness towards 
international law’, 
 or there are those who propose to explain much more widely why Switzerland and the 
world around it are highly interdependent. 
We hope to contribute to the debate on the interactions of the Swiss legal system with a dense 
web of international norms and actors. We will start a research project next year and will 
examine the concrete parliamentary structures and mechanisms in Swiss cantons that 
potentially support cantonal legislative actors to recognize, influence, defy or fulfil 
international obligations. 
In that continuing debate, we suggest that we need to keep analytically separate the 
description of the context from the identification of the motivations of those behind proposals 
such as the initiative by the Swiss People’s Party. Of course, it is entirely correct to observe 
that there are more numerous and more detailed international standards than a century ago, 
that supervision has increased, and international norms sometimes place very high ambitions 
on domestic actors, including domestic legislators. But we would take issue with explanatory 
attempts that suggest a monocausal and deterministic relationship between ‘more 
international norms’ and proposals such as this Swiss popular initiative. We do not deny that 
a relationship exists and that this relationship deserves to be taken seriously. Yet, in our view, 
the ‘self-determination initiative’ cannot and must not be explained by a simple reference to 
the increased relevance of international law and its institutions or globalization tout court. If 
the proponents emphasized that the Federal Constitution is the supreme source of the law of 
the Confederation, why would they attempt to curtail the power of the highest domestic 
tribunal to apply international law while at the same time continuing its opposition to the 
introduction of judicial review against the federal legislator that would precisely allow the 
Constitution to play a more important role in the domestic legal system? We believe that 
additional explanatory factors play a role. Quite simply, not everyone shares the idea that ‘all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. There is nothing surprising about 
the fact that courts and other institutions protecting fundamental rights are not always 
unequivocally welcome. Let’s hope that the rejection of the proposal by the Swiss voters is at 
least a glimmer of hope to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the UDHR. 
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